The Russia Monitor

First Shots Fired, Rostekhnadzor Loses 70% of its Men

I do not even have time to write a post about the issue of corruption in Russia, without some occurrence that directly relates to my subject. Yesterday, Nikolai Kutin, the head of the Federal Service for Ecological, Technical and Atomic Supervision (Rostekhnadzor), stated that his agency is preparing for "large-scale reductions and 'purges' of high-level personnel - both in Moscow, and in the regions." What does 'large-scale' mean? 70% of managers of the territorial organs have already left or will soon leave 'on their own accord.' When all is said and done, there will only be two managers still with the agency that were there in September 2008, when Kutin took over as head of Rostekhnadzor. And no, this does not have to do with the crisis, or budget cuts. The reason, according to Kutin, is that the 70% of managers who are now leaving are corrupt bribe-takers. Keep in mind that Rostekhnadzor is tasked with ensuring the safety of: mining and industrial operations; non-military atomic energy operations; the electrical, hydroelectric, and heating grids; and, to top it off, "the production, storage, and use of industrial-grade explosive materials." Here is Kutin explaining his decision to the media:


In all fairness, Kutin was promoted from within Rostekhnadzor and, at Pres. Medvedev's request, started drawing up plans for the 'optimization' of his agency through the reduction of employees, which he publicly discussed in February. Everyone knows and agrees that the Russian bureaucracy is way too big - it doubled under Putin's watch - and must be reduced, especially in the context of the financial crisis and attendant budget deficits. Also, I am comfortable with the idea that 70% of the managers responsible for the safety of Russia's nuclear power plants are corrupt and, therefore, can justifiably be fired. The problem is, if we accept that 70% are more likely than not guilty absent specific accusations, then that means the other 30% must be guilty as well.

Indeed, these purges - [za]chistki ['cleanings'] in Russian - have been around forever, and reached their bloodiest point during the 'Great Purge' [Чистка Партийных Рядов] of Stalin in the 1930s. Perhaps the most notable recent example was the Tri Kita scandal in 2006, when 19 high-ranking government officials from primarily the FSB were simultaneously fired while their boss, Nikolai Patrushev, was out of town on vacation. Around that same time - the start of Putin's second term - I think there was a lot of this going on, but just not on such a dramatic or confrontational scale.

So, is Kutin's personnel 'optimization' of Rostekhnadzor's personnel the beginning of a massive, government-wide, and protracted zachistka? I think several factors indicate that the answer is possibly, if not probably, yes!

Go on to Part II of my post where I will explain how repo men and deputy prosecutors are the main actors in a plan to keep Medvedev in power!